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Abstract
In 1965 Dag Prawitz presented an extension of Gentzen-type systems of Natural Deduc-
tion to modal concepts of S4. Maria da Paz Medeiros showed in 2006 that the proof of
normalisation for classical S4 does not hold and proposed a new proof of normalisation for
a logically equivalent system, the system NS4. However two problems in the proof of the
critical lemma used by Medeiros in her proof were pointed out by Yuuki Andou in 2009.
This paper presents a proof of the critical lemma, resulting in a proof of normalisation for
NS4.
1 Introduction
In his Ph.D. thesis, Dag Prawitz [4] extended the Gentzen-type systems of Natural Deduc-
tion (ND) to modal concepts, obtaining Gentzen-type systems of ND for S4 based on classical,
intuitionistic and minimal predicate logic. For this purpose, a modal operator of necessity
(here represented by ) was added together with the rules for its introduction and elimination.
Prawitz then presented three formalizations of those modal systems, which differed in the re-
strictions on the introduction rule for the , and stated that only the third one would accept
the Normalisation Theorem.
About forty years later, Maria da Paz Medeiros [3] argued that Prawitz’s normalisation
procedure does not work on the third version of the ND system for classical S4, and proposed
a new system for S4, the NS4, for which the Normalisation Theorem would hold.
However, recently Yuuki Andou [1] pointed out two problems in the proof of a lemma (the
critical lemma) that plays a crucial role in Medeiros’ s proof of the Normalisation Theorem.
Andou presented a Normal Form Theorem [1], showing that for any proof Π there is a proof Π′
in normal form by means of cut-elimination, but do not present a normalisation procedure.
In this paper we present a correction of Medeiros’s proof of the aforementioned lemma and
fulfil a normalisation procedure for NS4, which gives a computational interpretation of proofs
by means of the Curry-Howard Correspondence.
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After some definitions used in the present work (Section 2), we outline the original third
version of Prawitz’s system for classical S4 and the counterexamples by Medeiros (Section 3).
We then discuss the two cases in which the system may not produce valid derivations on NS4
due to problems in the proof of the critical lemma (Section 4). In Section 5 we present a proof
of the critical lemma for NS4. Our concern here is with Classical Propositional S4, but an
extension of Classical First Order S4 could be easily obtained by adding the corresponding rules
for quantifiers.
2 Definitions
Based in the work of Maria da paz Medeiros [3], we present the definitions used in this work.
Definition 1. The premisses (A → B) of the rule (E→), (A ∧ B) of (E∧), (A ∨ B) of (E∨),
(A) of (E), and the premisses B1, ...,Bn of (I) are called major premisses and the others
minor premisses.
Definition 2. A segment in a derivation is a sequence A1, ..., An of occurrences of the same
formula in a branch such that A1 is not the conclusion of an application of (E∨) nor a discharged
assumption through an application of (I), and An is not a minor premiss of (E∨) nor a major
premiss of (I).
Definition 3. The length of a segment is the number of formula occurrences in this segment.
Definition 4. A maximal segment in a derivation is a segment A1, ..., An such that A1 is the
conclusion of an application of an introduction rule or (⊥c), and An is a major premiss of an
application of an elimination rule.
Definition 5. A maximal formula is a maximal segment whose length is 1(one). A premiss is
called maximal premiss if it belongs to some maximal segment.
Definition 6. A formula A is a trivial formula if A is the conclusion of an application of (⊥c)
and the minor premiss of an application of (E→) whose major premiss is the assumption ¬A.
Definition 7. The degree of a formula A, G(A), is the number of occurrences in A of logical
symbols different from ⊥. The degree of a segment is the degree of the formula that belongs to
this segment.
Definition 8. The degree of a derivation Π, G(Π) is the highest degree of a maximal segment
of Π. If Π does not have maximal segments, then G(Π) = 0.
Definition 9. A critical derivation is a derivation Π such that, if G(Π) = d, then the last
inference of Π has a maximal premiss with degree d, and for every subderivation Σ of Π, G(Σ) <
G(Π).
Definition 10. The index of a derivation Π is I(Π) = 〈d, s〉, where s is the sum of the lengths
of the maximal segments of Π whose degree is d. If Π does not have maximal segments, then
I(Π) = 〈0, 0〉.
Definition 11. A derivation Π is a normal derivation if Π does not have maximal segments.
Definition 12. A formula A is essentially modal when each occurrence of a predicate parameter
or predicate constant in A stands within the scope of an occurrence of .
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3 A counterexample for Prawitz’s classical S4 system
According to the restriction on the -I rule in Prawitz’s third version of S4, if a formula A
depends on an assumption B and there exists an essentially modal formula F on the thread of
A from B such that A depends on every assumption which F depends on, then -I could be
applied at A.
But Maria da Paz Medeiros [3] argued that such restriction would not avoid maximal formulas
by pointing out that although the following derivation
[¬A]1 ¬A→ B
B ¬B
⊥
1
A
A
C → A
(C → A)
is valid in S4, its reduction is not:
[A]1
A [¬A]2
1
⊥
¬A ¬A→ B
B ¬B
⊥
2
A
C → A
(C → A)
It was presented a new Natural Deduction for S4 system, called system NS4 and proposed
a normalisation proof by critical lemma [3]. This new system is composed of the logical symbols
∧,∨,→,⊥ and  and the usual rules, except for -I, which is as follows:
 ~B
[ ~B]k
Λ
A
k
A
(We use
~F
 ~B
for a sequence of deductions of the form
Πi
Bi
, where no two Bi’s are equal.
We also write [ ~B]k to indicate that each Bi is discharged at k. Labels may be dropped.)
This restriction on -I rule states that all the assumptions in [ ~B]k must be discharged by
the application of -I and the premiss A must not depend on any assumption other than the
ones in  ~B. The reason for this is explained in item 4 of the proof of the critical lemma and it
does not affect the completeness of the system.
Together with this new -I rule, we have the following reduction:
~Σ
 ~B
[ ~B]k
Λ
A
k
A
A
⊲
~Σ
( ~B)
Λ
A
(1)
3
and the permutative reduction bellow:
~Σ
 ~A
[ ~A]i
Λ1
B
i
B
~Ψ
 ~D
[B]j [ ~D]k
Λ2
C
k, j
C
⊲
(2)
~Σ
 ~A
~Ψ
 ~D
[ ~A]j
[ ~A]k
Λ1
B
k
(B) [ ~D]i
Λ2
C
j, i
C
4 A problem in the normalisation proof of NS4
Medeiros’s normalisation proof [3] begins with the assumption that a derivation Π of C from Γ
can be transformed in a derivation Π0. The aim is to show that I(Π0) < I(Π). Next, it uses
a critical lemma according to which, if Π is a critical derivation of C from Γ, then Π can be
transformed into a derivation Π′ such that I(Π′) < I(Π). By the critical lemma, a subderivation
Σ of Π can be transformed in a subderivation Σ′ such that I(Σ′) < I(Σ); but, then, Π1 is the
derivation resulted from the substitution of Σ′ for Σ in Π0, and I(Π1) < I(Π0).
However, recently Yuuki [2] pointed out two flaws in the proof of Medeiros’s critical lemma.
The first one concerns critical derivations of the form
Π ≡
Σ0,1
F [¬F ]i
⊥
Σ0,2
⊥
i
F
~Σ
~H
r
C
(3)
where the major premiss F is the conclusion of ⊥C and r is an elimination rule. According to
Medeiros, this derivation can be transformed into
Π′ ≡
Σ0,1
F
~Σ
~H
r
⊥
Σ0,2
⊥
or to Π′′ ≡
Σ0,1
F
~Σ
~H
r
C [¬C]i
⊥
Σ0,2
⊥
i
C
(4)
depending on C being ⊥ or not.
Note that the assumptions of the form ¬F discharged at the rule i may occur more than
once in Π, and that the premiss F which is conclusion of Σ0,1 may be a maximal premiss in
Π′ and in Π′′. In this case the index of either Π′ or Π′′ may be even greater than that of Π.
Besides, one of the Hi’s in ~H, say Hl, may be a maximal formula of degree G(F ) and, in this
case, even if the F side connected with ¬F is not a maximal formula in Π′, this Hl still is and
the induction hypothesis cannot be used.
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The second problem pointed out is when Π has degree G(A) and is a critical derivation of
the form
Π ≡
~Σ
 ~B
[ ~B]k
Λ1
A
k
A [¬A]i
⊥
Σ0
⊥
i
A
~Ψ
 ~C
[A]j[C]ℓ
Λ2
B
ℓ, j
B
(5)
If A occurs more than once as top-formula of Λ2, by reducing Π to
Π′ ≡
~Σ
 ~B
~Ψ
 ~C
[ ~B]j
[ ~B]k
Λ1
A
k
A [C]ℓ
Λ2
B
ℓ, j
B [¬B]i
⊥
Σ0
⊥
i
B
the number of occurrences of A as maximal formula in Π′ will be greater than in Π.
Thus, it is possible that the reduction process generates copies of maximal formulas, so the
index of Π′ may be greater than that of Π.
5 Yet another proof of the critical lemma
We present a proof of the critical lemma for the fragment {∧,→,⊥,}. Extensions to First
Order Logic is only handwork.
Lemma 1. A critical derivation of the form Π ≡
[¬F ]1
Σ1
⊥
1
F
~Σ
~B
r
C
where F is the conclusion of
⊥c, can be transformed in a derivation
Π1 ≡
Σ′
1,1
F [¬F ]1
⊥
Σ′
1,2
⊥
1
F
~Σ
~B
r
C
where Π1 is a derivation without trivial formulas. Thus, the
end-formula of Σ′
1,1 is not conclusion of ⊥c.
Proof. See the work of Medeiros [3].
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Note that Π1 has no more maximal formulas of degree equal to or higher than G(F ) than
Π. We will use the symbol ∝ to indicate the transformation of a derivation into a derivation
without trivial formulas.
Theorem 5.1. If Π is a critical derivation of C from Γ, then Π can be transformed into a
derivation Π′ such that G(Π′) < G(Π).
Proof. Suppose Π is a critical derivation with maximal premisses of degree G(Π) which are
premisses of the last inference of Π, #G(Π) is the number of maximal formulas of Π with degree
G(Π) and ℓ(Π) is the lenght of Π. The proof is by induction on the pair 〈#G(Π), ℓ(Π)〉.
1. Π ≡
Σ1
A
Σ2
B
A ∧B
A
⊲
Σ1
A
≡ Π′
It is easy to see that G(Π′) < G(Π).
2. Π ≡ Σ1
A
[A]
Σ2
B
A→ B
B
⊲
Σ1
(A)
Σ2
B
≡ Π′
It is easy to see that G(Π′) < G(Π).
3. Π ≡
~Σ
 ~B
[ ~B]
Λ1
C
C
C
⊲
~Σ
( ~B)
Λ1
C
≡ Π′
If there exists a Bl which is a maximal premiss at Π
′, then it would be a maximal formula
at Π and, as Π is a critical derivation, G(Bl) < G(C). Thus, G(Π
′) < G(Π).
4. Π ≡
~Σ
 ~B
[ ~B]k
Λ1
A
k
A
~Ψ
~H
[A]j , [ ~H]l
Λ2
C
j, l
C
⊲
~Σ
 ~B
~Ψ
~H
[ ~B]l
[ ~B]k
Λ1
A
k
(A) [ ~H]j
Λ2
C
j, l
C
≡ Π1
We have two cases to consider:
(a) there is an occurrence of A which is top-formula of Λ2 and major premiss of an
application of -E : in this case, the number of maximal formulas of degree G(A)
in Π1 may be even greater than that of Π, as there may be more than one occurrence
of A as top-formula of Λ2.
There is a critical subderivation Ξ1 of Π1 of the form  ~B
[ ~B]k
Λ3
A
k
A
A
which can be
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reduced to Ξ′
1
≡
 ~B
Λ3
A
(case 3).
(b) there is an occurrence of A which is top-formula of Λ2 and major premiss of -I :
then, there is a critical subderivation Ξ2 of the form
 ~B
[ ~B]k
Λ3
A
k
A
~Υ
 ~C
[A]p, [ ~C]q
Λ4
D p, q
D
The lenght of Ξ2 is smaller than the lenght of Π. Hence, by induction hypothesis, we
can reduce Ξ2 to a Ξ
′
2
such that G(Ξ′
2
) < G(Π).
Note that we cannot guarantee that the lenght of Ξ2 is smaller than the lenght of
Π if there were more than one occurrence of A as top-formula of Λ2 in Π1, and if
there were many occurrences of A as major premiss in Ξ2. That is the reason of
the restriction on the beginning of the section.
Let Π2 be the result of replacing each occurrence of critical subderivations of the form of
Ξ1 and the form of Ξ2 in Π1 by Ξ
′
1
and Ξ′
2
respectively.
If A is the only major premiss that is maximal formula in Π, i.e., there is no member
of ~H which is a maximal premiss of the same degree of Π, then G(Π2) < G(Π) and
Π2 = Π. Otherwise, i.e., if there exists a m such that Hm is a maximal formula in Π, then
#G(Π2) < #G(Π) and, as Π2 is a critical derivation, by induction hypothesis Π2 can be
transformed into a derivation Π′ such that G(Π′) < G(Π2). Hence, as Π was transformed
into Π2 and G(Π2) is not higher than G(Π), G(Π
′) < G(Π).
5. Π ≡
[¬(A ∧B)]1
Σ1
⊥
1
A ∧B
A
∝
Σ′
1,1
A ∧B [¬(A ∧B)]1
⊥
Σ′
1,2
⊥
1
A ∧B
A
⊲
Σ′
1,1
A ∧B
A [¬A]1
⊥
Σ′
1,2
⊥
1
A
≡ Π1
If the end formula of Σ′
1,1 is not the conclusion of an introduction rule, then the end-formula
of Σ′
1,1 is not a maximal formula and G(Π1) < G(Π) and Π1 ≡ Π
′. If the end formula of
Σ′
1,1 is the conclusion of an introduction rule, then Π1 is of the form
Σ3
A
Σ4
B
A ∧B
A [¬A]1
⊥
Σ′
1,2
⊥
1
A
which can be reduced to
Σ3
A [¬A]1
⊥
Σ′
1,2
⊥
1
A
≡ Π′ and G(Π′) < G(Π).
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6. Π ≡
[¬(A→ B)]
Σ1
⊥
A→ B
Σ2
A
B
∝
Σ′
1,1
A→ B [¬(A→ B)]1
⊥
Σ′
1,2
⊥
1
A→ B
Σ2
A
B
⊲
Σ′
1,1
A→ B
Σ2
A
B [¬B]1
⊥
Σ′
1,2
⊥
1
B
≡ Π1
If the end formula of Σ′
1,1 is not the conclusion of an introduction rule, then G(Π1) < G(Π)
and Π1 ≡ Π
′. If the end formula of Σ′
1,1 is the conclusion of an introduction rule, then Π1
is of the form
[A]
Σ3
B
A→ B
Σ4
A
B [¬B]1
⊥
Σ′
1,2
⊥
1
B
which can be reduced to
Σ4
(A)
Σ3
B [¬B]1
⊥
Σ′
1,2
⊥
1
B
≡ Π′ and G(Π′) <
G(Π).
7. Π ≡
[¬A]
Σ1
⊥
A
A
∝
Σ′
1,1
A [¬A]1
⊥
Σ′
1,2
⊥
1
A
A
⊲
Σ′
1,1
A
A [¬A]1
⊥
Σ′
1,2
⊥
1
A
≡ Π1
If the end formula of Σ′
1,1 is not the conclusion of an introduction rule, then G(Π1) < G(Π)
and Π1 ≡ Π
′. If the end formula of Σ′
1,1 is the conclusion of an introduction rule, then Π1
is of the form
~Ψ
 ~B
[ ~B]k
Λ1
A
k
A
A [¬A]l
⊥
Σ′
1,2
⊥
k, l
A
which can be reduced to
~Ψ
( ~B)
Λ1
A [¬A]l
⊥
Σ′
1,2
⊥
l
A
≡ Π2
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If one of the Bi’s, say Bm, were a maximal formula in Π2, it would be a maximal
formula in Π and, as Π is a critical derivation, G(Bm) < G(A). Thus, G(Π2) < G(Π)
and Π2 ≡ Π
′.
8. Π ≡
[¬A]k
Σ1
⊥
k
A
~Ψ
~H
[A]l, [ ~H]j
Σ2
C
l, j
C
∝
Σ′
1,1
A [¬A]k
(⊥)
Σ′
1,2
⊥
k
A
~Ψ
~H
[A]l, [ ~H ]j
Σ2
C
l, j
C
⊲
Σ′
1,1
A
~Ψ
~H
[A]l, [ ~H ]j
Σ2
C
j, l
C [¬C]k
(⊥)
Σ′
1,2
⊥
k
C
≡ Π1
Note that Σ′
1,1 is a subderivation of Σ1. Hence, if the subderivation Λ ≡
Σ′
1,1
A
~Ψ
~H
[A]l, [ ~H ]j
Σ2
C
l, j
C
of Π1 is a critical derivation, its lenght is smaller than the lenght of Π. Thus, by the induc-
tion hypothesis, Λ can be reduced to a derivation Λ′ such that G(Λ′) < G(Π). The result
of replacing each occurrence of Λ in Π1 by Λ
′ is a derivation Π′ such that G(Π′) < G(Π).
9. Π ≡
[¬F ]1
Σ1
⊥
1
F
~Ψ
~H
r
⊥
∝
Σ′
1,1
F [¬F ]1
⊥
Σ′
1,2
⊥
1
F
~Ψ
~H
r
⊥
⊲ Π1 ≡
Σ′
1,1
F
~Ψ
~H
⊥
Σ′
1,2
⊥
The critical subderivation Λ ≡
Σ′
1,1
F
~Ψ
~H
⊥
of Π1 is smaller than Π. Thus, by the
induction hypothesis, Λ can be reduced to a derivation Λ′ such that G(Λ′) < G(Π). By
replacing each occurrence of Λ in Π1 by Λ
′ we achieve the desired derivation. This case
deals with classical ⊥ with the elimination of implication, conjunction and box.
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10. Π ≡
[¬F ]1
Σ′
¬F → C
C
Σ
⊥
1
F
el
B
⊲Π′ ≡
[F ]1
B [¬B]2
⊥
1
¬F
Σ′
¬F → C
C
Σ
⊥
2
B
If ¬F → C were a maximal formula in Π′, it would be a maximal formula in Π, which is not
the case as, by hypothesis, G(Π) = G(F ) and G(F ) < G(¬F → C). Hence, G(Π) < G(Π′).
6 Conclusions
This work presented the problem pointed out by Maria da Paz Medeiros [3] on the normalisation
procedure proposed by Dag Prawitz [4], followed by the system that she proposed [3], the NS4.
She presented a normalisation proof for this system for which we presented the problems pointed
out by Yuuki Andou [2] and finally we presented a proof of the Normalisation Theorem for NS4.
Among other deductive systems for S4, there are some where the Normalisation Theorem
holds, like Sequent Calculus. There is also a Natural Deduction with Labels system by Alex
Simpson [5] for which the Normalisation Theorem holds. But the system proposed by Dag
Prawitz [4] and Maria da Paz Medeiros [3] are pure Natural Deduction systems, without semantic
interferences (as the labels from the system of Alex Simpson) for which there are no previous
proof of the Normalisation Theorem known into the available literature. Yuuki Andou showed
that for any proof of S4 there is a normalised proof via cut-elimination [1] but did not present a
normalisation procedure. We fulfilled it by presenting a correction in Medeiros’ proof that lead
to a normalised Natural Deduction system for S4, the NS4 system.
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